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Abstrct 
The financial reporting scandals that was recorded in Enron, Cadbury Nigeria and some banks like Oceanic bank, 
International bank and Afribank has prompted researchers and regulators to investigate the incidence of earnings 
management in Nigeria and abroad.The main objective of this study is to investigate whether banks in Nigeria 
manage their earnings through the use of loan loss provisions.Data was collected from the fact book of The 
Nigerian Stock Exchange and published financial statements of 11 banks. The study used a  one sample T-Test, 
Descriptive statistics and pooled linear regression model which was estimated using an ordinary least squares 
procedure and employing Statistical Package for Social Science Programme to analyse the data collected. The 
result reveals that earnings management management through the use of loan loss provision is present in Nigeria 
banks. The study recommends that regulatory agencies responsible for meintaining finanicial reporting quality 
like the SEC, CBN and FRC should device a means of monitoring financial statements of reporting organisations 
(banks in particular) quaterly. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
A common feature of the corporate form of business is the separation between ownership and control (Sanda, 
Minkailu and Garba, 2004). Some of the owners of the businesses lack the time or skills to run the business so 
they appoint managers and saddle them with the responsibility of directing the business profitably to create value 
for its owner and other stakeholders. 
Due to the fact that owners are usually not involved or present in the running of the business, it will be 
difficult for them and other interested stakeholders to value the assets and liabilities of the business accurately. 
Managers on their own part might not be sincere enough to present the true picture of the performance and 
profitability of the business but are allowed to apply their own discretion to make judgment within the Generally 
Acceptable Accounting Principle (GAAP) on some accounting related issues like stock valuation, estimating 
depreciation, amount to be set aside as provision against bad debt and warranty expenses (Bagnoli & Watts, 
2005).  
Nonetheless, researchers and regulators have raised concerns over the use of these managerial 
discretions in valuing items on the financial statement. For instance, Levitt (1998) expressed concerns on 
financial statement manipulation and its effect on resource allocation. He mentioned that management abuse of 
premature revenue recognition is threatening the credibility of financial statement. These abuses were reportedly 
practiced by some organisations in the United States (Levitt, 1998). 
Consequently, in Nigeria, Kantudu (as cited in Nyor, 2010) in his study found that earnings of some 
deposit money banks are being smoothed. Subsequently, in 2010 the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)Governor 
lamented that part of the reasons for the banking crisis of 2008 was as a result of financial statement 
manipulation which is otherwise known as earnings management (Sanusi, 2010). 
In the light of the discuss, the main objective of this study is to investigate whether banks in Nigeria 
manage their earnings through the use of loan loss provisions. As ealier stated, earnings management has been 
found to be practiced through different method like stock valuation, research and development, loan loss 
provisioning etc. This study therefore seeks to investigate whether the discresions giving to managers on loan 
loss provision are used to manage earnings. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the conceptual and empirical litrature 
on audit committee financial expert and earnings management. Section 3 discusses the methodology used for the 
study. In section 4, the result of the data analysed are presented and discussed. Section five concludes the study 
by making recomendations. 
 
2.0 LITRATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Concept of Earnings Management 
The literature has not provided a single definition of earnings management as different researchers have viewed 
earnings management from different perspectives base on which aspect of the financial statement is affected and 
who benefits from the earnings management. For instance, Mulford and Comiskey (2002) regards earnings 
management as an inter-period concept where some portion of earnings is moved from one period to the next. 
Here, earnings management is defined base on the present need and the future activities adjusted to suit the 
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Further, most of earnings management practice like all management activities are intended to be for or 
against a particular stakeholder (note, managers are part of stake holder of the organization). In this regard, 
Kinney and Trezervet (1997) as cited in Babalyan (2004) define earnings management to include classificatory 
manipulation and selective disclosure. An example of such manipulation is the disclosure of operating loss as 
extraordinary item. In the light of this definition, managers use the provision in GAAP to practice earnings 
management since earnings numbers are not affected in situation where the discretion is exercised on 
classification and disclosure in the income statement.  
Considerable portion of earnings management remains within the boundaries of flexibility embedded 
in accounting standards (this could be the reason why Enron had to hire experts from the Accounting Standard 
Board to find loop holes in the Accounting standards). This is also one of the reasons why auditors might not 
easily find a formal ground to query earning management. Also, while some authors place more emphasis on the 
misleading intent of earnings management, e.g. Healy and Wahlen(1999), others do not agree entirely with the 
negative definition of earnings management, hence, they try to show theoretically and empirically its 
opportunistic versus informative nature (Wange, 1994).  
Both researchers and practitioners have come to agree that earnings Management is accomplished 
using the flexibility inherent in accounting standards (Babalyan, 2004). This flexibility mostly is in form of 
accounting accruals, which represent non-cash revenues and expenses as well as book gains and losses. Accrual 
process is intended to mitigate the timing and matching problems of cash flows, so that earnings better reflect the 
firm’s performance (Babalyan, 2004). 
Banking regulations on the other hand require that banks satisfy some certain capital adequacy 
requirements that are written in terms of accounting numbers (Healy &Wahlen, 1999). However, studies carried 
out on earnings management and bank regulatory capital have shown that managers sometimes have strong 
incentive to match regulatory capital and financial constraints. Biurrun and Rudolf (2010) indicate that more 
stringent bank regulation are associated with more earnings management and banks manage both capital and 
earnings using accounting, investment, and financing discretion (Beatty, Chamberlain & Magliolo, 1993). 
In addition, since the Basel Accord of 1988 which harmonized minimum capital adequacy regulations 
and changed the structure of the capital adequacy ratio which by implication made loan loss reserves not part of 
Tier I capital in the numerator of the capital adequacy ratio? Some researchers have documented evidence that 
banks still use loan loss provision for capital management (Ahmed, Takeda, Thomas, 1999; Anandarajan, Hasan 
& McCarthy, 2007).  
Researchers have shown that loan loss provision is one of the components of banks’ earnings subject 
to manipulation (Ahmad et al 1999, Beatty et al, 2005). Loan loss provisions are an expense item listed on the 
income statement reflecting management's current period assessment of the level of future loan losses. Specific 
provisions are made on the basis of perceived risk of default on specific credit facilities while general provisions 
are made in recognition of the fact that even performing credit facility harbours some risk of loss no matter how 
small (CBN Prudential guideline, 2010).  
The regulators recognizing the fact that the managers have the first hand information about their 
debtors and as a result, the prudential guideline and the statement of accounting standard No. 14 left the 
determination of the time and amount to increase such provision at the discretion of bank managers. More 
specifically, the Statement of Accounting Standard number 14 noted that ‘the precise time at which provisions 
should be made against risk is a matter of judgment’ i.e. each bank should develop a formal procedure for 
identifying non-performing facilities and evaluating loan losses and a systematic method of making provision for 
losses. Researchers have found that managers use such timing discretion to smooth earnings and in other 
situations manage regulatory capital (Ahmad et al 1999, Beatty et al, 2005). 
As managers increase loan loss provisions net income decreases, while a decrease in the recording of 
loan loss provisions increases net income. That is to say, banks regulatory capital, loan loss provisions are 
sensitive to bank earnings. Taxable net income of a bank can generally be increased by interest income, service 
revenues, securities gains and losses. It can be reduced by interest expense, operating costs, loan loss provisions, 
and income tax expense. It will be practically difficult for banks to significantly change interest income or 
expense, service revenues or operating costs during financial periods or at the year-end since they are non-
discretionary.  
Hence, the loan loss provision is the only income component that can be revised interim and adjustable 
at the year-end. This special feature has no doubt makes it a natural choice of bank managers’ earnings discretion 
since investors and regulators can hardly verify the validity of the managers’ decision of the loan loss provisions 
( Beatty et al., 1995; Collins Shackelford & Wahlen, 1995). 
Commercial bank regulators view accumulated loan loss provisions, the loan loss allowance account 
on the balance sheet, as a type of capital that can be used to absorb losses during bad times. If a bank's loan loss 
allowance balance exceeds its expected loan losses, the bank can absorb more unexpected losses without failing 
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and imposing losses on the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC). Conversely, if a bank's loan loss 
allowance is less than expected losses, the bank's equity capital will be reduced when and if the expected loan 
losses materialize. This implies that the bank's capital ratio can overstate its ability to absorb unexpected losses.   
Previous researchers, most of whom concentrated on financial institutions in the United States and 
Europe, concluded that at one stage or another, LLPs were used as a tool for capital management (Collins, 
Shackelford and Wahlen, 1995; Moyer, 1990), for earnings management (Ahmed, Takeda and Thomas, 1999; 
Beatty, Chamberlain and Magliolo, 1995; Greenawalt and Sinkey, 1988; among others) and for signalling future 
intentions to the stock market (Liu, Ryan and Wahlen, 1997).   
In summary, loan loss provisions can be used as a worthwhile manipulation tool by bank management 
to reach their desired results and with low detection risk within short periods since they are highly manipulative 
with a reasonably low risk of detection. Also, bank managers’ judgments and discretion will always be necessary 
in estimating loan loss provisions in each period. Hence, their judgments cannot be possibly changed or replaced. 
Guided by SAS No. 14 in Nigeria and SFAS No.5 in the USA, managers can execute judging selecting amount 
and timing of loan loss provision. 
From the perspective of the relationship that exist between the shareholders and managers, and the 
possibility of managers to engage in earnings management practices; agency theory gives a good theoretical 
framework of the mechanisms put in place to reduce earnings management practice through the establishment of 




This study covers 7 years reporting period starting from 2005 to 2011.The population of this study comprises of 
the 21 banks (deposit money banks) operating in Nigeria as at 31st December, 2011. Base on the fact that it will 
be difficult to obtain comparable data for the time frame adopted for the study especially from 2007 to 2009 due 
to the changes in the names of some banks. This study therefore employs a two point filter to drop banks that are 
thought unsuitable for collecting data for the study. These filters are: (i) scaling the difficulty of the 2005 
banking sector consolidation without structural change affecting the name of a bank, and (ii) being quoted and 
remaining quoted on the Nigerian stock exchange for the last nine years. The filters is applied to ensure the 
associability and availability of comparable data for the years under review and also to ensure easy accessibility 
of annual financial statements. Consequently, upon application of these filters, the new population of the study is 
reduced to 11 banks namely Access Bank Plc., Diamond Bank Plc., Ecobank Nigeria Plc., Fidelity Bank Plc., 
First Bank Plc., First City Monument Bank Plc., Guaranty Trust Bank Plc.,Starling Bank Plc., Union Bank Plc. 
United Bank for Africa Plc., and Zenith Bank plc.  
This gives a new population of 11 out of old population of 21 banks. This represents 52 % of the old 
population which is sufficient to obtain a valid and reliable result. Relevant data are selected from the financial 
report as the study is a census study which makes use of the entire component in the population (i.e. banks).The 
data used were collected mainly from secondary sources like published financial statements of banks and fact 
book of The Nigerian Stock Exchange. 
Additionaly, Beatty et al (2002) model is used in this toestimate discretionary loan loss provisions 
which empirical studies have found as an item that is used by managers to manage earnings. In other words, we 
measure earnings management by modeling for discretionary loan loss provision which is acheieved with the 
modified Beatty et al (2002) model as stated thus; 
LOSSit = αtr+ β1LASSETit + β2∆NPLit + β3LLRit + eit ….  (Eq 2) 
Where: 
i = bank holding identifier; 
t = year; 
LOSS = loan loss provisions as a percentage of total loans; 
LASSET = the natural log of total assets; 
∆NPL= change in nonperforming loans (includes loans past due 90 days or more and still accruing interest and 
loans in nonaccrual status) as a percentage of total loans; 
LLR = loan loss allowance as a percentage of total loans; 
ε = error term. 
The error term or residuals from this regression is the discretionary part of loan loss provision that 
researchers have found to be used for earnings management (Cornett, etal. 2009). Consistent with the model, we 
expect the loan loss provision to be higher when there is an increase in nonperforming loans and also when the 
beginning loan loss reserve is high. Hence, we also predict that the coefficients on ∆NPL and LLR will be 
positive. 
Consistent with the model, we expect the loan loss provision to be higher when there is an increase in 
nonperforming loans and also when the beginning loan loss reserve is high. Hence, we also predict that the 
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coefficients on ∆NPL and LLR will be positive. 
In the prudential guide line issued by the CBN in 2010, the coefficients of β4 to β8 are regarded as 
specialized loans and hence, additional guidelines regarding their provision are required and are treated 
separately. While the coefficient of β9 is regarded as retail loans (CBN Prudential Guide line 2010, Sec, 12.3). 
This classification was effected for financial statements prepared for 2010 and beyond. To avoid the problem 
that will result from missing data for specialised and retail loans for the years 2005 to 2009, this study will 
consequently modify the model to exclude specialised and retail loans.  This modification will not affect the 
model as according to Beaty et al (2002), their “model does not make any prediction regarding these loans”. The 
modified Beaty et al (2002) model is stated thus: 
LOSSit = αtr+ β1LASSETit + β2∆NPLit + β3LLRit + eit ….  (Eq 2) 
Where: 
i = bank holding identifier; 
t = year; 
LOSS = loan loss provisions as a percentage of total loans; 
LASSET = the natural log of total assets; 
∆NPL= change in nonperforming loans (includes loans past due 90 days or more and still accruing interest and 
loans in nonaccrual status) as a percentage of total loans; 
LLR = loan loss allowance as a percentage of total loans; 
ε = error term. 
The error term or residuals from these regression is the discresionary part of loan loss provision that is 
mostly used for earnings management. For the purpose of this study, a higher residuals depicts higher earnings 
management. 
Finally, from the above model (Eq. 2) the study defines earnings management such that higher levels 
of earnings management increase earnings and a lower level of earnings management will ultimately decreases 
earnings. In this regard, this study defines earnings management as thus: 
EMit = DLLPit....... (Eq. 3) 
The study predicts that a high level of earnings management will result to underreporting loan loss 
provisions which can increase reported income while, low levels of EM, which are often negative, suggest that 
loan loss provisions are over-reported and thus decrease reported income. 
Further, to acheive the objective of this study, this study used quantitative methods to analyse the the 
data collected. The method of data analysis is divided in to three part. The first part is carried out by using a 
pooled linear regression model estimable by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) procedure to test for the presence of 
earnings management using the Beaty et al (2002) model. While the second step will be analysis of the first 
result using descriptive statistics. Finally, a T-Test is used to test whether result are statisticaly significant to 
make valid conclusions and recomendations. These are all achieved by and employing the Statistical Package for 
Social Science (SPSS) statistics program for a total of 77 observations ( 11 banks × 7 years).  
 
4.0 Results and Findings 
The results of these study is analysed in two fold. Firstly residuals from the regression analysis are tested using a 
one sample T-Test. This is caried out to test the statistically significance of the residuals. The T-Test result is 
stated thus: 
Table 4.1: T-Test Result 
One-Sample Test 
 Test Value = 0                                        
 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the Difference 
 Lower Upper 
Earnings Management 91.266 76 .000 .56583 .5535 .5782 
Source: SPSS output 
From the T-Test result of table 4.1, the residuals of earnings management is significant at 1%. This 
indicate that the result from the subsequent analysis can be relied upon for valid statistical analysis as presented 
in the descriptive statistics. 
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TABLE 4.2: Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
 Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
EM 77 .43 .68 .5658 .05440 -.549 .274 -.051 .541 
          
Source: SPSS output 
From table 4.2, the mean for earnings management for the banks is 57% with the highest at 67% and 
lowest at 43%. The mean of 57% indicates that the practice of earnings managements by banks for the years is 
relatively strong for the years. The lowest of 43% indicates that there was not a single time during the study 
period that earnings management was not practiced.  
 
5.0 Conclusion and Recomendation 
This study right from the onset seeks to investigate whether banks in Nigeria where managing their earnings 
through loan loss provisions for the period 2005 to 2011. The study found that earnings management through 
loan loss provisions are practiced in Nigeria though at a fairly reasonable scale. The scale of the practice could 
be attributed to the fact that earnings management through loan loss provisioning is quite technical to practice 
because of the Basel accord and the fact that it has to be undone (i.e the earnings management) in the next quater. 
Finally, the study recommends that the regulatory agencies responsible for meintaining finanicial 
reporting quality like the SEC, CBN FRC should device a means of monitoring financial statements of reporting 
organisations (banks in particular) quaterly. Further, as it was recommended by SOX in the USA, independent 
internal monitors of financial reporting i.e audit reporting committee should have an accounting expert. 
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